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CASE COMMENTS
THE EARLY RIGHT-TO-SUE LETTER: HAS THE EEOC
EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY?
Henschke v. New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center
821 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
In Henschke v. New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center,' the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that
the issuance of an "early" right-to-sue letter2 by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC)3 fails to invoke federal subject matter
jurisdiction over a Title VII claim and requires a suspension and remand
of the claim to the EEOC.4
Dr. Claudia Henschke, a treating physician and professor of radiology,
filed gender-based discrimination charges with the EEOC against New
York Hospital and Cornell Medical Center.5 After receiving an early right-
1. 821 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
2. A right-to-sue letter constitutes official notice from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to an aggrieved party that the party may institute a Title VII claim in federal
court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988). See also Michelle Kissell Price, Note, Relieffrom Retaliation:
Does Title VII Allow a Private Right to Preliminary Injunctive Relief?, 25 TULSA L.J. 639, 640 (1990).
The EEOC issues an "early" right-to-sue letter when it issues a letter to a claimant within 180 days
from the date the claimant filed charges with the EEOC. See Price, supra, at 640.
3. By enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended "to assure equality
of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44
(1974) (citations omitted). To further this goal, Congress created the EEOC to investigate charges of
discrimination, promote voluntary cooperation with Title VII, and institute civil actions against
employers named in a charge. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1988). In addition, Title VII requires
cooperation between an individual claimant and the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988). Each
claimant must file charges with the EEOC and obtain a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC before
instituting a private Title VII civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a), (f) (1988). See also McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
4. Henschke, 821 F. Supp. at 170-71. This Case Comment focuses upon whether the EEOC's
failure to wait 180 days before issuing a right-to-sue letter deprives a federal court of subject-matter
jurisdiction in a private civil action. The propriety of injunctive relief during that same time period is
beyond the scope of this Case Comment. For a discussion on Title VII injunctive relief procedure, see
generally Price, supra note 2.
5. 821 F. Supp. at 168. Dr. Henschke claimed that the defendants appointed "a less qualified
male" as acting chief of the radiology department and denied her access to necessary information,
equipment, and personnel. Id.
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to-sue letter from the EEOC, Dr. Henschke filed suit in federal court.6
The defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that Dr. Henschke failed to
wait the 180 days mandated by Title VII 7 before requesting her letter and
filing suit in federal court.' Dr. Henschke argued that the early right-to-
sue letter complied with EEOC regulations interpreting Title VII.9 The
district court rejected Dr. Henschke's argument and held that an early right-
to-sue letter divests the court of jurisdiction requiring suspension and
remand'0 of a Title VII claim to the EEOC."
The conflict in the Henschke decision stemmed from the Title VII
provision that guarantees an individual the right to a private civil suit.'2
Section 2000e-5(f)(l) provides that if the EEOC has not filed a civil action
or achieved a conciliation agreement within 180 days of the filing of a
charge, the EEOC must notify the person aggrieved. 3 The person
aggrieved may then bring a private civil action within ninety days. 4 The
6. Id. Dr. Henschke filed charges with the EEOC on September 21, 1992 and simultaneously
requested an early right-to-sue letter. On October 22, the EEOC issued the letter. On November 16,
Dr. Henschke filed suit in federal court. Id.
7. Section 2000e-5(f)(l) provides:
If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, is dismissed
by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge
... the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section... or the Commission has
not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the
Commission... shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after giving such
notice a civil action may be brought ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988).
8. 821 F. Supp. at 168.
9. Id. at 170. In 1977, the EEOC codified its long-standing practice of issuing early right-to-sue
letters in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2). The EEOC regulations provide:
When a person claiming to be aggrieved requests, in writing, that a notice of right to sue be
issued ... the Commission may issue such notice as described in 1601.28(e) with copies to
all parties, at any time prior to the expiration of 180 days from the date of filing with the
Commission; provided that [a director] has determined that it is probable that the Commission
will be unable to complete its administrative processing of the charge within 180 days from
the filing of the charge....
29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) (1993).
10. Henschke, 821 F. Supp. at 170. The court suspended the plaintiff's claim pending
resubmission of the charges to the EEOC for the remainder of the 180 day waiting period. Id. at 171.
The court also granted Dr. Henschke leave to amend her Title VII claim and gave her the opportunity
to reactivate her claim upon five days' notice. Id.
11. Id. at 170.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1988) (conferring jurisdiction over Title VII claims on the federal
district courts).
13. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(l).
14. Id. Originally, section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission.... the Commission has
been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this title, the Commission shall so notify the
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EEOC typically uses right-to-sue letters to give claimants the notice
required by section 2000e-5(f)(l). t5 Although courts generally agree that
the provision requires the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue letter after 180 days
have passed, 6 courts differ over whether the EEOC may voluntarily issue
a right-to-sue letter within that same 180 day period, relinquishing
jurisdiction over a Title VII claim.17 While only one circuit court has
directly addressed the validity of the early right-to-sue letter,18 the district
courts have debated the issue for nearly twenty years.
The validity of the early right-to-sue letter turns upon whether Congress
intended to make the passage of 180 days a jurisdictional prerequisite to
private civil action 9 or merely a time limit after which the EEOC must
formally notify a claimant of the exhaustion of administrative remedies.2"
Unfortunately, the legislative history of amended section 2000e-5(f)(l) fails
to address directly the early right-to-sue letter. In discussing section 2000e-
5(f)(1), Congress expressed two competing concerns: maintaining the
EEOC's primary role in Title VII disputes while protecting a claimant's
person aggrieved and a civil action may, within 30 days thereafter, be brought against the
respondent named in the charge ....
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 241, 260 (1964) (prior to 1972
amendment) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f(1) (1988)).
In 1972, Congress amended § 2000e-5(f) as part of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 104 (1972) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988)). The new provision retains the individual's right to private civil
action, but extends the time period for EEOC action from 30 to 180 days and private civil action from
30 to 90 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
15. See 821 F. Supp. at 170. The EEOC's procedural regulations for right-to-sue letters are found
at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28. The EEOC's regulations provide in pertinent part:
The notice of right to sue shall include: (1) Authorization to the aggrieved person to bring a
civil action under Title VII ... within 90 days from receipt of such authorization; (2) Advice
concerning the institution of such civil action by the person claiming to be aggrieved, where
appropriate; (3) A copy of the charge; (4) The Commission's decision, determination, or
dismissal, as appropriate.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e) (1993).
16. See, e.g., Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n, 585 F.2d 421,425 (1978). See also Price, supra
note 2, at 640.
17. Compare Howard v. Mercantile Trust Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9842, at 6502 (E.D.
Mo. Nov. 27, 1974) (upholding early right-to-sue letter) with Budreck v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 407 F.
Supp. 625 (N.D. La. 1976) (finding 180 days a condition precedent to jurisdiction).
18. The Ninth Circuit approved the early right-to-sue letter in Bryant, 585 F.2d at 425. In Weise
v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit, in dictum, disapproved of the early
right-to-sue letter, id. at 412.
19. Budreck, 407 F. Supp. at 645 (finding that 180 day requirement is jurisdictional). See infra
notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
20. See Howard, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 6504 (holding that a letter can be sent within 180
days). See infra notes 26-28, 53-56 and accompanying text.
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right to speedy relief." However, these dual concerns support the
opposing sides of the Henschke conflict with equal force. If the EEOC
constitutes the primary source of relief for Title VII claimants, then neither
the claimant nor the EEOC should bypass EEOC jurisdiction.22 On the
other hand, if the EEOC recognizes the impossibility of settlement or
investigation within 180 days,23 an early right-to-sue letter protects the
claimant's right to speedy relief.24
In Howard v. Mercantile Trust Co.,' the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri became one of the first courts to uphold
the early right-to-sue letter. In Howard, the court found that the language
in section 2000e-5(f)(1), "within one hundred and eighty days," gave the
EEOC discretion to interpret the procedure.26 In addition, the court relied
upon the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,27 which held that a plaintiff need only file charges with the EEOC
and receive a statutory right-to-sue letter before filing a private civil action
21. The Senate Conference Report from the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 provides:
It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not the rule, and that
the vast majority of complaints will be handled through the offices of the EEOC or the
Attorney General, as appropriate. However, as the individual's rights to redress are
paramount under the provisions of Title VII, it is necessary that all avenues be left open for
quick and effective relief.
118 CONG. Rc. 7166, 7168 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams).
22. See id. at 7168 (stating that recourse to a private lawsuit should be the "exception and not the
rule'); H.R. RaP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137,2148
(stating that individual complainants should not cut short the administrative process merely to encounter
similar delays in court proceedings).
23. The applicable regulations authorize an early right-to-sue letter when the EEOC has determined
improbable its processing of a charge within 180 days. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) (1993). See supra
note 9.
24. This right was recognized by Congress:
[The bill] provides the aggrieved party a means by which he may be able to escape from the
administrative quagmire which occasionally surrounds a case caught in an overloaded
administrative process... .The primary concern must be protection of the aggrieved person's
option to seek a prompt remedy in the best manner available.
H.R. REp. No. 238, supra note 22, at 12-13, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2147-48.
25. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9842, at 6502 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 27, 1974).
26. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 6503. In addition, the court reasoned that because the language
could easily indicate a maximum rather than minimum time period, courts should not strictly enforce
the provision. Id. Indeed, in Milner v. National Sch. of Health Technology, 409 F. Supp. 1389, 1392
(E.D. Pa. 1976), the court found that "[t]he statute does not require a minimum of 180 days for
conciliation; rather, it requires issuance of a right-to-sue letter within 180 days." See also Wells v.
Hutchinson, 499 F. Supp. 174, 189 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (holding that the EEOC must issue a right-to-sue
letter within 180 days).
27. 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
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under Title VII.2s While generally approving of the early right-to-sue
letter, the Howard court left open the possibility that a reviewing court
could remand cases in which the EEOC had abused its discretion in issuing
the letter.29 The court concluded that returning to the EEOC a case in
which it would take no further action within the 180 day period served no
useful purpose. °
Two years later, in Budreck v. Crocker National Bank,31 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California wrote an
extensive opinion rejecting the reasoning in Howard.32 The Budreck court
found that section 2000e-5(f)(1) 3 makes the passage of 180 days a
condition precedent to a private civil action.34 In so holding, the court
dismissed McDonnell Douglas as dictum35 because the 180 day provision
was not before the court in either of the cases and because it contained
inconsistencies.36 In addition, the court pointed to a number of policy
reasons for rejecting early right-to-sue letters. The court reasoned that
dismissal of premature claims would deter other plaintiffs and the EEOC
from avoiding statutory procedure,37 give parties more time to settle
28. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 6503. The Howard court inferred that because the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas did not mention the 180 day period as a prerequisite to suit, the plaintiff
need not wait 180 days before filing a private civil action. Id. Courts have criticized this inference,
however, stating that the Court was addressing a separate issue and may have assumed that the EEOC
would wait 180 days before issuing a right-to-sue letter. See, e.g., Budreck v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 407
F. Supp. 635, 641-42 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
29. 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at 6504.
30. Id. The court noted, "Delay for the sake of delay is of no value." Id. Accord Milner, 409
F. Supp. at 1392; Lewis v. FMC Corp., I 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 31 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 1975).
31. 407 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
32. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 7.
34. 407 F. Supp. at 645. The court stated that a plaintiff may file a private civil action only if:
(1) 180 days have passed since the plaintiff filed charges with the EEOC, or if the charges have been
dismissed, and (2) the plaintiff has obtained a right-to-sue letter. Id. at 639. The court based its
determination on the plain language of the statute. Id. The court also found support for its ruling in
the legislative history. Id. at 690.
35. The court considered and rejected McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
and Johnson v. Railway Express, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), as binding authority. 407 F. Supp. at 641-42.
36. 407 F. Supp. at 641-42. The court contrasted McDonnell Douglas, which stated that a plaintiff
need only file charges with the EEOC and receive a right-to-sue letter before filing a private civil suit,
with Johnson, which held that "the claimant, after the passage of 180 days, may demand a right to sue
letter." The court rejected McDonnell Douglas because the 180 day provision was not at issue and the
Supreme Court could have assumed that no civil action would be brought before 180 days. Id. at 641-
42.
37. Id. at 645. The court noted that early right-to-sue letters merely shift EEOC congestion to an
"already overburdened federal judiciary." Id. at 643. Similarly, the court found Johnson dictum
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privately,38 and would comport with appropriate prudential restraint by the
judiciary to avoid rewriting the legislation.3 9  The Budreck court conclud-
ed that if the statutory procedure needs revision, only the legislature can
properly implement such a change.4"
Several courts have taken an approach that lies between the Howard and
Budreck positions by holding that, while theoretically the EEOC should not
issue early right-to-sue letters, certain circumstances warrant an exception
to the rule. For example, in Weise v. Syracuse University,4t a claimant's
initial Title VII charge remained before the EEOC for 180 days.42 When
the claimant added a second Title VII charge against the same employer,43
the Second Circuit held that the EEOC did not need to wait an additional
180 days before issuing notice to the claimant of the right to sue."
Similarly, in Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 Northern California Counties
Joint Apprenticeship & Training Committee,45 the court allowed the
claimant to proceed under an early right-to-sue letter when she had
previously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.4 The court found
that a claimant must ordinarily wait 180 days after filing with the EEOC
to bring suit in order to effectuate Congress' intent to promote conciliation
because the Supreme Court did not have to consider the 180 day provision to decide whether the statute
of limitations for section 1981 claims is tolled by a timely filing with the EEOC. Id. at 642.
38. Id. at 643-44. The Budreck court maintained that parties can reach informal settlement during
the 180 day period without the EEOC's guidance. Id. at 644.
39. Id. at 643. The court opined that allowing early right-to-sue letters would "delay even longer
a truly adequate solution to an exceedingly serious problem" and would "make the federal courts the
primary, rather than secondary, forum for Title VII disputes." Id.
40. Id. See McGee v. Purolator Courier Corp., 430 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 (N.D. Ala, 1977)
(refusing to permit private action absent a statutory right-to-sue letter).
41. 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975).
42. Id. at 412. In Weise, the court consolidated two cases of sexual discrimination against
Syracuse University. Id. at 400. Plaintiff Selene Weise filed an initial charge with the EEOC on May
8, 1972. Id. at 412. This charge was before the EEOC when she filed a second charge on June 25,
1973. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. The Second Circuit acknowledged that technically the second charge should have remained
before the EEOC for 180 days, unless dismissed. Id. However, the court found that because the initial
charge had been before the EEOC for more than 180 days, conciliation was unlikely. Thus, strictly
enforcing the 180 day provision would not have furthered the Congressional goal of settlement and
would hinder expeditious relief. Id. The court's policy reasons mirror the Howard court's reasoning.
See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
45. 440 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Notably, Judge Renfrew wrote both the Eldredge and
Budreck opinions. For a discussion of Budreck, see supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
46. 440 F. Supp. at 517. Although the court denied the motion for preliminary relief, the court
reasoned that the mere request for an injunction made settlement improbable. Id. at 516.
[VOL. 72:757
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and voluntary settlement.47 However, the court held that when the motion
for preliminary relief is proper, a court has jurisdiction over the substantive
claim.
48
In 1977, the divergence between the Howard and Budreck camps grew
even wider. The Supreme Court decided Occidental Life Insurance Co. v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,49 stating, in dictum, that a
private right of action under Title VII does not arise until 180 days after a
claimant has filed charges with the EEOC. 0 However, the EEOC
subsequently published procedural regulations specifically authorizing itself
to issue early right-to-sue letters.5 Accordingly, both sides of the conflict
gained supporting authority.52
Only one year after Occidental, in Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n, 3
the Ninth Circuit declared that a plaintiff need not wait 180 days before
receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 4 The Bryant court relied
upon the plain statutory language in holding that although section 2000e-
5(f)(1)"5 prohibits a claimant from demanding a right-to-sue letter during
the 180-day waiting period, the statute does not prohibit the EEOC from
voluntarily issuing a letter during that same period. 6 Further, the court
reasoned that Congress would not force an individual to delay invoking a
47. Id.
48. Preliminary relief is proper when there is "a high probability of success on the merits and the
threat of irreparable harm." Id. While the court recognized that dismissal would "discourage the EEOC
from divesting itself of claims prematurely," the court found it too harsh to deny jurisdiction when the
EEOC would be unable to dispose of the case in any event because preliminary relief is appropriate.
Id.
49. 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
50. Id. at 361. The court stated:
The 180-day limitation provides only that this private right of action does not arise until 180
days after a charge has been filed.. . . [A] natural reading of[§ 2000e-5(f)(l)] can only lead
only to the conclusion that it simply provides that a complainant whose charge is not
dismissed or promptly settled or litigated by the EEOC may himself bring a lawsuit, but that
he must wait 180 days before doing so.
Id. The court's statement is dictum.
51. See supra note 9. Section 2000e-12(a) provides that the EEOC "shall have authority... to
issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of [Title VII]." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1988).
52. Although the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Occidental was dictum, the EEOC could
have given effect to the Supreme Court's language by not seeking early right-to-sue letters. When the
EEOC authorized early right-to-sue letters, however, it kept the issue alive and precipitated further
litigation.
53. 585 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
54. Id. at 425.
55. See supra note 7.
56. 585 F.2d at 425.
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right to relief until the EEOC had performed its duties." Thus, the
Bryant court concluded that it would be a "travesty" to require that the
EEOC and claimant wait for the expiration of 180 days. 8
By contrast, several district courts insisted that the EEOC had abused its
administrative discretion in codifying59 the early right-to-sue letter. For
example, in Spencer v. Banco Real, S.A., 6" the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York issued a scathing critique of the
EEOC regulations and declared them invalid." The court found that the
EEOC regulations created a new discretionary power that the EEOC could
potentially abuse. 2 Further, the Spencer court accused the EEOC of using
the early letters as a guise to shift its workload to the federal court
system 3 and suggested that the EEOC should instead improve its
57. Id. (quoting Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps, 456 F.2d 1359, 1361 (9th Cir. 1972)).
58. Id. The court based this statement upon EEOC inability to handle charges within the 180 day
period. Id. For other cases allowing jurisdiction over pre-180 day cases, see Saulsbury v. Wismer &
Becker, Inc., 644 F.2d 1251, 1251 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming Bryant); White & Allen v. Federal Express
Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1552 (E.D. Va. 1990) (stating that Title VII must be construed generously
to achieve a remedy for employment discrimination); Rolark v. University of Chicago Hosp., 688 F.
Supp. 401, 404 (N.D. Iil. 1988) (noting that courts should grant deference to an EEOC interpretation
unless it is contrary to congressional intent); Cattell v. Bob Frensley Ford, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 617, 621-
22 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (noting that requiring a plaintiff to "sit twiddling her thumbs" would not make
sense).
The Cattell court correctly pointed out that denying federal jurisdiction could result in a "catch-22"
situation: Suppose the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter within 90 days of the date of filing charges
with the EEOC. Because section 2000e-5(f)(l) requires that a claimant must file suit in federal court
within 90 days of receipt of the right-to-sue letter, to force the claimant to wait 180 days from the date
of filing with the EEOC would deprive him or her of a private civil action. 505 F. Supp. at 622 n.4.
59. See supra note 9.
60. 87 F.R.D. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
61. Id. at 747.
62. Id. at 746. The Spencer court feared that aggrieved persons would seek to litigate EEOC
decisions granting or denying early right-to-sue letters. Id. Further, the court was concerned with the
lack of standards to guide agency decisions under the new resolution. Id.
63. Id. The Spencer court stated, "It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the
exception and not the rule." Id. at 744 (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7168 (1972)). The court noted
that the EEOC could only speculate as to its inability to process a charge within 180 days. Id. Thus,
early letters might possibly deprive the EEOC of jurisdiction over matters it could have decided. Id.
Further, the court reasoned that if claimants remain before the EEOC during the 180 days, they will
press the agency for action rather than right-to-sue letters, thus "spurring" the agency to greater
efficiency. Id.
In declaring the regulations invalid, the Spencer court relied on Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S.
807 (1980). In Mohasco, the Court invalidated regulations that deviated from the literal language of
Title VII. Id. at 825. The Mohasco court stated that the EEOC may not interpret Title VII in a way
that supersedes the language chosen by Congress. The Court also warned, "Even if the interests of
justice might be served by [a different reading of the statute], in the long run, experience teaches us that
strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of
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efficiency.' 4
In Henschke v. New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center,65 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York declared that
the 1977 EEOC regulations66 violated the express language of Title
VII.6 7  Henschke argued that because Congress had charged the EEOC
with Title VII administration, courts should defer to the EEOC's interpreta-
tion of section 2000e-5(f)(1). In response, the court stated that an EEOC
interpretation warranted deference only if it adhered to congressional
intent.69 Because section 2000e-5(f)(l) makes the 180-day waiting period
a condition precedent to federal subject-matter jurisdiction, no deference
was warranted."
In reaching its decision, the Henschke court acknowledged that the 180-
day waiting period could lead to injustice.7 The court reasoned that the
parties might wait 180 days without achieving conciliation,72 and noted
the Ninth Circuit's characterization of such a waiting period as a "traves-
ty."" However, without much discussion, the Henschke court concluded
that the language of Title VII left no alternative but to remand Henschke's
evenhanded administration." Id. at 826.
64. Spencer, 87 F.R.D. at 746. See, e.g., True v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs.,
613 F. Supp. 27, 30 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that the legislature, not the judiciary, must address the
problem); Mills v. Jefferson Bank East, 559 F. Supp. 34, 36 (D. Colo. 1983) (declaring EEOC
regulations invalid as inconsistent with congressional intent); Hiduchenko v. Minneapolis Medical &
Diagnostic Ctr., 467 F. Supp. 103, 107 (D. Minn. 1979) (holding that failure to wait 180 days is a
"jurisdictional defect"); Grimes v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1381, 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1979)
(charging EEOC with avoiding responsibility); Loney v. Carr-Lowrey Glass Co., 458 F. Supp. 1080,
1081 (D. Md. 1978) (finding EEOC regulations invalid).
65. 821 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
66. See supra note 9.
67. 821 F. Supp. at 170-71.
68. Id. at 170.
69. Id. The court relied upon Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980) (holding that
courts should reject EEOC regulations inconsistent with statutory mandate), see supra note 63, and
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Central Lincoln People's Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 402 n.3 (1984) (stating
that courts must reject administrative constructions contrary to congressional intent, "whether reached
by adjudication or rulemaking") (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting FEC v. Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Comm'n, 454 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1981)).
70. 821 F. Supp. at 170-71. The Court found that the statutory language explicitly requires
dismissal or the passage of 180 days as a condition precedent to the validity of a right-to-sue letter.
Id. at 170.
71. Id. at 171.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 171 n.4 (quoting Bryant, 585 F.2d at 425). For a discussion of Bryant, see supra notes
53-58 and accompanying text.
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claim to the EEOC.74
The Henschke court erred in holding that section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires
180 days to expire before the EEOC may voluntarily issue a right-to-sue
letter. The court exaggerated the clarity of section 2000e-5(f)(l).
While section 2000e-5(f)(1) clearly provides a deadline for EEOC
action,76 it does not specifically address the situation in which the EEOC
completely processes a charge within 180 days or declares that it will be
unable to handle a charge within that time.77 Therefore, although a
claimant must wait 180 days before demanding a right-to-sue letter,78 it
does not necessarily follow from the statutory language that the EEOC may
not issue a letter during those same 180 days.79
Moreover, the Henschke court failed to accord proper deference to the
EEOC interpretation of section 2000e-5(f)(1). Because Congress expressly
granted the EEOC power to issue procedural regulations to carry out Title
VII,"0 the EEOC's interpretation of section 2000e-5(f)(1) should stand
unless it clearly contradicts the language or intent of that section.8"
Because the twenty year split among the district courts demonstrates that
reasonable minds can differ over the language and intent of section 2000e-
5(f)(1), s2 the EEOC's interpretation of section 2000e-5(f)(1) warrants
74. 821 F. Supp. at 171.
75. Id. at 170. For the statutory text, see supra note 7.
76. See supra note 7; H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 22, at 12-13, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2147-48.
77. See Bryant, 585 F.2d at 425. The statutory language does not refer to these circumstances.
See supra note 7.
78. See Bryant, 585 F.2d at 425. The statute clearly requires notice of the litigant's right-to-sue
as a precondition to a private suit. See supra note 7. Further, the language indicates that there is no
right to such notice before the expiration of 180 days. The word "shall" follows the 180 day limitation
in section 2000e-(f)(1). See supra note 7.
79. Bryant, 585 F.2d at 425. On this point, the Spencer decision and like cases are open to attack.
Spencer's assertion that the "if" language in section 2000e-5(f(1) denies the EEOC the opportunity to
issue an early right-to-sue letter, 87 F.R.D. at 743, ignores the "within" language of the statute, see Id.
Further, the "if" language could just as easily describe the period in which the EEOC must issue a
right-to-sue letter rather than restricting the EEOC's ability to issue a letter before the expiration of 180
days. See id.
80. See supra note 51.
81. Because the statutory language was ambiguous, the court's review of the EEOC regulations
was limited to determining whether they were "a permissible construction of the statute," in this case,
Title VII. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1983). See also supra note 58.
82. Compare Howard v. Mercantile Trust Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 19842 (E.D. Mo. Nov.
29, 1974) and Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n, 585 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated on other
grounds, 444 U.S. 598 (1980) with Budreck v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 407 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
and Spencer v. Banco Real, S.A., 87 F.R.D. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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THE EARLY RIGHT-TO-SUE LETTER
deference in the absence of a specific statutory prohibition of the early
right-to-sue letter."
The Henschke decision reaffirms cases such as Budreck and Spencer in
their refusal to defer to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII. 84
Undoubtedly, the drafters of Title VII did not intend to cause a claimant
alleging discrimination needless delay in filing a private civil suit.8
Unfortunately, the Henschke court's reading of the statute does just that.
Instead, district courts should defer to the EEOC's interpretation of Title-
VII. Future dismissals of cases due to early right-to-sue letters will result
in a "travesty"86 contrary to the letter and spirit of Title VII.
Valerie J. Pacer
83. "We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer and the principle of
deference to administrative interpretations." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. Such deference is not necessary
"in the absence of an administrative interpretation." Id. However, because the EEOC has issued
regulations allowing early right-to-sue letters, courts such as the one in Henschke fail to properly restrict
their review. In particular, the Spencer court's consideration of policy beyond the statutory language
and legislative history, 87 F.R.D. at 746-47, was clearly improper.
84. See cases cited supra notes 31, 60.
85. See supra notes 21, 24.
86. Bryant, 585 F.2d at 171.
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